

acter who played such a notorious role in Petrograd last July.

It is evident that the larger part of the new ministers are of the masses. However, Riazanoff, Minister of Communications, is a technical engineer who has been associated during the last few months with a general in charge of transportation.

M. Nolin, Minister of Commerce, has nothing to his credit but passion and ability. He distinguished himself at the debates of the Council of Workers and Soldiers by bitter tirades against Kerensky's government and the bourgeoisie.

Lieutenant Krylenko, one of the members of the Army and Navy Committee, is a typical son of the revolution. He is a gifted popular orator, and acquired a reputation as an agitator. He is generally known as "Comrade Abram" and reputed to be totally unfit for any administrative post.

Of the three men with national reputations, Lunacharsky, Minister of Education, is the more widely known and trusted. The names of both Trotsky and Lenin, the other two of the trio, have been linked with German propaganda and agents. No charges have ever been made against Lunacharsky. He was one of Russia's ablest publicists before the revolution of last March, and, unlike Trotsky or Lenin, was not in exile or hiding. He had an excellent reputation among all progressives and contributed to "bourgeois" publications.

Leon Trotsky, alias Braunstein, who occupies the Foreign Ministry, is a capable man. His reputation and past have been discussed from impossible angles that it is almost impossible to qualify his character. He has been accused of being in contact with German agents, but, on the other hand, he has been idolized by the masses. Trotsky's standing as a revolutionary goes back to many years, but even most of his opponents believe in his integrity, but consider him fanatical and visionary.

Nikolai Lenin, alias Ulianoff, was born and raised in the same city with Kerensky, Simbirsk. He is fifteen years older than Kerensky, and a brother of Lenin, a university student, was executed by the Czar's hangmen. This incident made a deep impression on Kerensky.

Lenin was practically the creator of the Russian Social Democratic party twenty years ago. He is the author of many books on political and economic socialism and up to the revolution was respected by all Russians.

U. S. Withholds Recognition of Bolshevik Rule

WASHINGTON, Nov. 10.—Secretary of State Lansing announced today that two telegrams had been received from Ambassador Francis at Petrograd, one dated the 7th, the other the 8th, the former conveying practically the same information concerning the coup d'état in Petrograd as contained in press dispatches, the second reciting that the American Red Cross workers in Russia are all well.

Ambassador Francis cabled that all the members of the government had been arrested, except Premier Kerensky himself. It was difficult, he stated, for him to secure any information about affairs outside of Petrograd, as every telegraph system leading into Petrograd was in the hands of the Bolsheviks. He knew virtually nothing about the situation in Moscow.

The ambassador's telegram described the fighting in Petrograd between the Maximalists and the forces loyal to the government. He stated that the disorders had ceased and that the capital was comparatively quiet.

America to Wait

Mr. Lansing added that the State Department had not been officially informed of the creation of a government by the Bolsheviks, and indicated that the United States would be in no haste to extend recognition to the usurper's authority. He stated that he declined to commit this government to any definite policy. He intimated, however, that several days might pass before it would be possible to judge the situation in Russia justly and to warrant any definite action in regard to it.

The Russian Embassy announced this afternoon it would refuse to accept the authority of the Maximalist government.

A statement issued by the embassy said: "Under present circumstances the Russian Embassy is unable to get any authoritative and full information as to the events in Russia, and therefore it is necessary to refrain from expressing any definite judgment on the bearing of the events which have taken place. However, the following is certain and indisputable:

"The Petrograd events are a revolt of a party against a national government. The Maximalists are in no way representative of the whole of Russia. If they have succeeded to seize power and will form a 'Maximalist government,' such a government cannot represent the will of the nation. Consequently, the Russian Embassy in Washington will refuse to accept its authority."

Several newspapers containing comment on the Russian coup d'état to arrive here make no attempt to jump at conclusions and predict speedy peace with Russia. On the other hand, the impression prevails quite widely that the Maximalists may be compelled by the force of circumstances to follow much the same policy as the Kerensky régime as soon as they find that a non-annexation peace is not to be attained early by proclaiming their readiness to conclude such a peace.

Several newspapers refer to the fact that the declared policy of the Maximalists is for a general peace, not a separate one, and this on the basis of absolutely no annexations. It is gen-

erally assumed, however, that the developments at Petrograd spell the end of the Russian army as an offensive factor in the present war and remove the last possibility that it will be reconstructed as an active military force or prove a serious obstacle to any German military plans.

The Berlin "Vorwärts," organ of the Socialist party, says the German Socialists, who are against Bolshevik methods for their own land, cannot advocate them for Russia. They are in accord with the Bolsheviks, however, in rejecting all annexations.

The "Vorwärts" then develops the remarkable thesis that good might emerge from the situation if the Bolshevik government, which places peace above the integrity of Russian territory, and the Central Powers, refusing annexations, should all unite on the basis of renunciation of Poland and other disputed areas, leaving the people to settle their own destiny. The newspaper remarks that such a sight would be unique in history, and that it depends on two great questions—whether the Bolsheviks remain in power and whether the German Socialists are strong enough to impose this desire upon the government.

The "Vorwärts" evidently is disturbed at the triumph of a party whose programme is opposed by German Socialists. It criticizes the Bolshevik dogma of "dictatorship of the proletariat" when such dictatorship is exercised by a small minority of Russian Socialists.

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Return of Kerensky to Power Likely to Follow Blow at Petrograd

By Isaac Don Levine

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The report of a German landing in Finland bears the earmarks of truth, as it also reports the landing of several Finnish detachments with the Germans. It is known that upward of three thousand Finns have volunteered to fight in the Prussian army against Russia. It is also known that since the Russian revolution these Finns have been formed into separate units, dedicated to the "liberation" of their fatherland.

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A statement issued by the German government in Berlin today, however, indicates that the German military branch of the government pursues its plans in a regardless manner. It has long planned some kind of a coup along the Russian Baltic Sea littoral. Kerensky's recent activities in the German fleet near Riga also point in the same direction.

The latest reports show that the Teutons have not abandoned their plans because of the Maximalist revolt. On the other hand, they probably intend to push ahead now, believing that it would not be difficult for them to capture Petrograd.

Defeat Would Unify Russia The Germans may be right as to the ease with which they could destroy the Russian fleet or capture the Russian capital. But by doing so they would render the greatest possible aid to the moderate and conservative elements of Russia. The Bolsheviks, the internationalists and the other pacifists would be wiped out of existence by a patriotic wave.

The Russians are essentially patriotic. Even the Russian radicals, who dream of universal brotherhood and communism, love their country passionately. The conservatives, liberals and radicals are now split into numerous factions. A German offensive could create a common state of mind and sentiment among all of them. The mujik would defend his land, the bourgeois his country, the radical the revolution, which is synonymous with free Russia.

If union is essential for the salvation of a country, then only in defeat can Russia find her salvation. The greater the German blow, the quicker the German elements in Russia. The German offensive, if it only develops, is to-day one great source of hope for a resurrection of Russia's nationalism and of her fighting spirit.

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Paris Council to Pick Command For All Fronts

Allied Generals, Named at Rome, May Direct Only Italian Operations

Unity of Command Plan Foreshadowed

Military, Naval and Supply Policies Must Be Coordinated; no Dictator in Sight

By C. W. Gilbert

WASHINGTON, Nov. 10.—It is not known here and the dispatches do not say whether or not the Inter-Allied War Council that was announced in Rome yesterday will have control of all the Allied operations or only of those on the Italian front. From the fact that its appointment arose from the special circumstances of the Italian disaster, it may be assumed that Generals Foch, Cadorna and Wilson will begin by directing only Italian operations.

The English and French having such a large stake in those operations now, through the aid they have sent to Italy, have probably insisted upon joint control of the war there. This union of command will end all the disagreements between Italy and her allies, and these disagreements have been grave, beginning with Italy's failure to declare war on Germany and continuing all the time Italy was thought to be making war in her own way and for her own ends alone, and stopping only when disaster to Italy brought all the powers together.

Another reason to think that this particular inter-Allied council will not be the big inter-Allied council is that the Paris conference has not yet been held, and the Paris conference is to discuss precisely this question of coordination. It is not likely that appointments such as those made in Rome would be announced just before the Paris conference unless they were purely local in their significance and would be subordinate to any organization effected later.

Paris Council to Include Navies The organization to be formed at Paris will have to be broader in its scope than this one just completed at Rome. This council is purely military. The council to be formed at Paris, if one is formed, will have to cover naval and supply operations at least, as well as military operations.

On the large scale of the whole alliance these three factors in the fight against Germany cannot be separated. They have been, in the opinion of the Administration here, too much separated in the past. The idea of those who are insisting upon joint control of the Allies is that military and naval policies in their widest application must be coordinated and that supply must be adjusted to military and naval policy.

The settlement reached in Italy is interesting as foreshadowing the settlement that is likely to be reached at Paris. This council is purely military. The council to be formed at Paris, if one is formed, will have to cover naval and supply operations at least, as well as military operations.

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At the National Hotel Men's Exposition at the Grand Central Palace beginning to-morrow, November 12th.

Victory in War Up To U. S. and Britain, Is Belief Abroad

This Is a Battle of Real Fighting Spirit, Pershing Tells Observer

Immediate coordination of all the forces of this country and its allies is absolutely necessary to bring the war to a victorious conclusion, according to Isaac F. Marcossin, who returned yesterday after a four months' visit to the French, British and Italian fronts.

From General Pershing, whom he saw at his headquarters in France, Mr. Marcossin brought the following message to the American people: "The American troops in France must be made to realize that the whole country is behind them. This is a war of the real fighting spirit, and the best way to keep that spirit alive is to have a united nation stimulating and encouraging its army at the front."

The Allies, particularly the British, Mr. Marcossin said, were of the opinion that it was the work of the United States and Great Britain to bring the war to an end.

"There has been too much optimism as regards the war," Mr. Marcossin said. "The situation at present is more critical than it has been in the last two years, and Germany is stronger than it was a year ago. Each annual autumnal foray which Germany has made—Serbia, Rumania, Russia and now Italy—has given her large quantities of supplies and strengthened her at home."

"The feeling is growing in the Allied countries that the war will last at least two years longer."

Regarding Russia, which he visited at the time of the revolution last spring, Mr. Marcossin said if she makes a separate peace at least 1,500,000 Austrian and German prisoners would be released and that Germany would be able to recruit and make almost a fresh start. "Lenine Mr. Marcossin characterized as the most dangerous destructive force in Russia."

Lenine has always been pro-German," he said. "He organized an anti-American demonstration, and with 3,000 followers paraded to the American Embassy, the windows of which were broken with stones."

"The tragedy of Russia is that Kerensky and Korniloff, representing conciliation and the policy of the mailed fist, could not agree. Together they could have saved Russia."

"Italy has no great grievance against Germany," Mr. Marcossin continued. "Austria is her enemy, and as soon as the troops heard that they were facing Germans they began to back down. In one week Italy lost ground which it took her eighteen months to gain, and I do not know whether she will ever be able to get it back."

Whitney Warren Sees Central Powers' Weak Point in the Adriatic

Paris, Nov. 10.—Whitney Warren, the New York architect, in an article in the "Petit Journal" calls attention to the naval situation in the Adriatic. "It is important," he says, "to foresee upon what point the methodical effort of the Allied forces can be directed with chances of success."</